Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (3/3). A military presence that is now greater than that of the former European powers

1. Flourishing security cooperation

As Türkiye has developed its diplomatic relations with African countries since the beginning of the 21st century, building embassies and forging economic partnerships, numerous security agreements have also emerged. These are of various kinds (training of local military units, authorisation for Turkish private security companies to operate, participation in the fight against terrorism, exchange of intelligence, etc.) but today they unite Ankara in terms of security with almost all the countries of northern, western and eastern Africa [1]. Military attachés, the officers responsible for promoting security cooperation with the country of the embassy to which they are seconded, often accompany these cooperation agreements; only Morocco and Egypt have not signed such agreements but have a military attaché [2].

One of the most tangible examples of this cooperation is the sale of Turkish military equipment to African countries. Here again, unlike American or European countries, which often impose conditions on the sale of their equipment to third countries [3], Türkiye stands out for its indifference in this respect. Since the rise of the Turkish defence industry in the early 2010s [4], Türkiye has gradually positioned itself as an increasingly significant exporter of military equipment. African countries have been among the main buyers of Turkish UAVs, in particular the Bayraktar TB2 combat aircraft, as well as Anka, Karayel and Aksungur aircraft, including Libya [5], Tunisia [6], Morocco [7], Niger [8], Nigeria [9], Ethiopia [10], Mali [11], Burkina Faso [12], Chad [13], Djibouti [14], Angola [15] and Somalia [16]. Others, such as Rwanda, are currently considering acquiring their own [17]. With the United States, France and their allies having rejected a large part of the Sahel-Saharan strip, any objections the former might have had to the latter procuring Turkish equipment are now non-existent - quite the contrary in fact - offering Türkiye a substantial market [18]. While drones are one of the most eloquent examples of the growing prosperity of Türkiye’s defence industries in Africa, they are increasingly making their mark with the sale of several other types of equipment, These include armoured vehicles (notably those manufactured by Katmerciler [19]) and training and combat aircraft (such as the Hürkuş-C, ideal for training but also capable of carrying out minor combat operations by taking off from improvised runways, a major asset for counter-insurgency campaigns in Africa [20] ).

Indeed, Türkiye’s arms exports to Africa, while still relatively small, have increased rapidly in recent years, rising from $83 million in 2020 to $460 million in 2021, for example [21]. They are driven by the growing success of Türkiye’s defence industries, whose exports in 2023 were valued at $5.5 billion [22], up from $248 million in 2002 [23]. Firstly, the country has made considerable progress in arms manufacturing in recent years, and its products have proved effective in a number of conflicts, including those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and Libya. Secondly, Turkish weapons, particularly drones, are generally much cheaper and easier to use - from an ethical and legal point of view, as mentioned above - than those of the United States and its allies. Finally, buying from Türkiye enables African states to obtain modern weapons without having to commit themselves to the United States, Russia or China, and thus feel that they are preserving the integrity of their national sovereignty; here again, the Turkish "third way" stands out in the game of the great powers. This role as an "external" player means that Türkiye can envisage unprecedented security cooperation based, as always, on a "win-win" partnership: Until 2021, for example, Türkiye has offered Tunisia 150 million dollars in the form of interest-free loans [24] for the purchase of Turkish military equipment; Tunis, whose army was in a critical state both financially and in terms of equipment [25], has thus been able to begin a new modernisation, while Turkish defence industries have been able to find a new importer for their products [26].

2. Turkish forces increasingly present across Africa

The most tangible sign of the growing acceptance of Turkish power in Africa is the fact that Türkiye’s armed forces have managed to gain a foothold at several points on African soil in recent years. The first success in this area was in Somalia, Ankara’s bridgehead in Africa; on 1st October 2017, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army - and now Minister of Defence - Hulusi Akar inaugurated the TURKSOM base south-east of Mogadishu [27]. Although the base is primarily intended to train 10,000 Somali soldiers - by 2023, 5,000 soldiers had already been trained [28] - it also provides the Turkish army with a significant foothold in the Horn of Africa. When it was built, the base was the largest Turkish military base abroad [29].

The presence of this base is all the more important given that on 27 July the Turkish Parliament approved the deployment of the Turkish Navy off the coast of Somalia [30] to provide security for Turkish offshore exploration activities planned in Somali territorial waters following an agreement signed less than ten days earlier, on 19 July 2024 [31]. The deployment of the Turkish navy off the coast of Somalia may also have something to do with an agreement signed in February 2024 between Ankara and Mogadishu stipulating that Turkish naval forces would undertake to rebuild a new Somali fleet and defend the country’s maritime territorial integrity [32]. A clear warning to Ethiopia, which has been engaged in a stand-off with Somalia for several months now, following the signing on 1st January 2024 between Addis Ababa and Harare - capital of the secessionist Somali region of Somaliland - of an agreement granting Ethiopia access to part of the Somali coastline and hence to the Red Sea [33]. Türkiye is also currently working to find a resolution to the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, hosting several delegations on its soil so that negotiations can be held between the protagonists [34].

Following the signing on 27 November 2019 of a political and economic agreement between Ankara and Tripoli redefining the maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean to enable Türkiye to legitimise the gas exploration operations it was preparing to carry out there [35], a new agreement, this time a military one, was signed between the two allies on 21 December of the same year [36] to ratify the deployment of the Turkish army on Libyan soil in order to come to the aid of the Tripolitan forces, which were in great difficulty against Marshal Hatfar’s fighters. On 5 January 2020, the first Turkish soldiers set foot in Libya [37]; in the months that followed, their support for the Tripoli government’s troops proved decisive and led the Turkish Parliament to systematically renew their mandate to operate on Libyan soil [38]. As part of their deployment and the alliance between Ankara and Tripoli, the Turkish forces have two bases in Libya: a naval and land base at Misrata [39] and an air base at Al-Watiya [40], which are still fully active today.

Finally, the case of the Sudanese island of Suakin, which receives much less media coverage than the Somali and Libyan cases, is interesting and bears witness to Ankara’s success in creating, over the last two decades, a robust network of partners and allies on the African continent. This island, formerly an Ottoman possession and once vibrant with the commercial and religious activity generated in particular by the passage of many pilgrims on their way to Mecca. However, on 26 December 2017, Sudan announced that it had granted Türkiye a 99-year lease on the island to restore the site [41] - thanks in particular to the TIKA development agency mentioned above [42] - and to build the infrastructure needed "to maintain civilian ships and military vessels" [43]. However, several countries in the region, led by Egypt, have expressed reservations about Türkiye using the island as a military base on the Red Sea [44]. The Sudanese authorities [45] and the Turkish authorities have in turn denied these accusations over the years [46].

3. SADAT: a "Turkish Wagner" giving Türkiye an unofficial military presence in Africa

One of the key players in Türkiye’s military and security deployment around the world, and particularly in Africa, is the discreet private security company SADAT [47]. Founded in 2012 by retired brigadier general Adnan Tanriverdi - and now run by his son Melih Tanriverdi [48] - the company offers a wide range of security services, including training for army and police units (parachute jumps, hostage management, urban assaults, etc.), the deployment of logistical solutions for military/police purposes and the supply of weapons. Particularly close to the AKP [49] and Islamic circles - Adnan Tanriverdi was compulsorily retired in 1996 during an anti-Islamic purge in the ranks of the army [50] -, SADAT has a politico-religious agenda that it does not conceal, stating on its website that it wants to "assist Muslim countries to help them play their role against the world’s superpowers" [51]. Adnan Tanriverdi, who was promoted to the rank of adviser to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan following the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, was asked to resign in January 2020 after declaring that he wanted to "prepare for the arrival of the Mahdi [52]" through his actions [53]. He had already put forward the idea on several occasions (to the Turkish Chief of Staff [54], to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation [55]…) that SADAT could make its services available to Muslim countries to help them form an "army of Islam".

Since then, following the example of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner, SADAT has been present wherever Turkish foreign policy has developed an interest. From the outset, the private security company’s mission has been to train and supervise a major part of the "Syrian National Army", the Syrian auxiliaries acting as mercenaries on behalf of Türkiye in northern Syria. While several battalions of the latter were sent by Türkiye under the aegis of SADAT [56] to fight on behalf of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 [57], the Turkish company close to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is also said to have sent Libyan fighters [58].

However, it is in Africa that SADAT is now increasingly used by Ankara to advance Türkiye’s ambitions on the continent. SADAT’s role was particularly notable during the Turkish intervention on behalf of Tripoli in 2019/2020, when it transported several thousand tonnes of weapons and military equipment and, in addition, more than a thousand Syrian mercenaries supervised by 88 SADAT supervisors [59]. Even more recently, in spring 2024, SADAT is said to have deployed a further thousand Syrian mercenaries to Niger [60] to secure "Turkish interests and projects" [61] mentioned in the previous part of this article - the mining agreement in particular - at a time when the security situation in Niger has been deteriorating steadily in recent months under the pressure of armed jihadist organisations operating in the Sahel [62]. For the same reasons, since the summer of 2024, "hundreds" (sic, no further details) of Syrian mercenaries have also been deployed in Burkina Faso and Nigeria to secure Turkish commercial and mining holdings [63]. While the exact details of the "aid to defeat terrorism" promised by a Turkish military delegation visiting Bamako on 9 August 2024 are not yet known [64] but certainly refer to Mali’s recent acquisition of various Turkish military equipment, including drones [65], SADAT is also present in the background; it has recently been given responsibility for the security of the head of the Malian junta, Assimi Goïta [66], who is reluctant to trust the Malian military in view of the epidemic of coups d’état that have hit Africa in recent years, particularly in the Sahel [67], most of which were carried out by members of the deposed leader’s Praetorian Guard [68].

Finally, in addition to these mercenary deployments, SADAT appears to be present in many other parts of the African continent, in particular to train the forces of Türkiye’s allies or partners. This is the case, for example, in Somalia [69], Chad [70], Ethiopia [71] or Togo [72]. The many security cooperation agreements signed by Ankara with African countries seem, in fact, to be based essentially either on the purchase of Turkish military equipment or - or also - on security services provided by SADAT [73].

So, taking into account the more than 2,000 Turkish soldiers deployed in Africa (around a hundred in Libya and two thousand in Somalia [74]) and, above all, the more than 4,000 Syrian mercenaries (around 3,000 in Libya [75] and more than a thousand in Niger [76]), Ankara can count on a force of more than 6,000 men obeying its orders on the African continent, spread across three countries. This is three times the number of forces at France’s disposal (or at least an equal number if only conventional forces and not Syrian mercenaries are counted), a historic power in Africa which, in a few months’ time, according to the reorganisation of African military forces called for by President Emmanuel Macron last June [77], should have a total of around 2,000 men (around 100 in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, around 300 in Chad and 1,450 in Djibouti [78]).

Conclusion

Türkiye has indisputably established itself as a regional power within the African continent in the present day. While certain regions of Africa appear to be more exposed to Turkish influence, notably in the north, west and east of the continent, Ankara’s influence is spreading across the entire African continent. This is particularly true given the openness of African countries to Türkiye’s diplomatic, economic and security investments. Türkiye’s approach, which has been described as a "third way" in the context of the major geopolitical actors, namely Russia, China, the United States and Europe, has enabled it to carve out a significant presence on the African geopolitical landscape. This has been achieved by winning the support and goodwill of numerous countries seeking a partner rather than a mentor. The successes of Türkiye’s strategy in Africa are becoming increasingly evident, marked by significant commercial achievements, unprecedented economic agreements (particularly in the energy sector), and the projection of military resources that now rival those of European powers. While Iran, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Israel are also seeking to position themselves in Africa and capitalise on the power vacuum left by the United States and Europe, Türkiye appears to be at the centre of a competition in which it already enjoys a significant advantage.